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In a powerful speech to celebrate the 40
th anniversary of China’s reform
and opening-up policy, Xi Jinping declared: “We must resolutely reform
what should and can be changed, and we must resolutely not reform
what shouldn’t and can’t be changed” (gai gai de, neng gai de, women jian-
jue gai; bu gai gai de, bu neng gai de, jianjue bu gai 该改的, 能改的, 我们坚
决改; 不该改的, 不能改的, 坚决不改). (1)
Xi’s speech captures and explains the dilemma in which, on one hand,
China has initiated the most repressive campaign against political dissidents,
real or perceived, as show-cased in the continuous crackdown on lawyers,
journalists, religious believers, and civil society activists, among others; and,
on the other, has jump-started the most systematic and structural legal re-
form, unprecedented since Chinese reform started 40 years ago. Xi’s speech
also reflects the duality of Chinese reform: sustaining and strengthening the
political system with the leadership of the CCP at the core and liberalising
the economic and social system. 
China continues to face and struggle with a dilemma similar to that ob-
served by Roberto Unger four decades ago: economic development de-
mands certainty and rule-based governance, but political control
necessitates flexibility and political expediency (Unger 1976). Politically,
China has turned decisively toward an illiberal and anti-liberal order, with
further concentration of political power reflecting the true nature of a well-
disciplined and well-ordered Party-state, as Lenin originally designed. So-
cially and economically, vibrancy has continued in the private sector and
semi-autonomous social spheres; both under the guiding hands of the Party,
of course. Yet, despite the recent overreach of the Party-state and attempts
to restrain the private sector and narrow social space, China’s semi-au-
tonomous social and economic spheres remain resilient. While the mighty
Party continues to shape and direct those semi-autonomous spheres, it has
shown a degree of deference to profit-driven market logic and the sponta-
neous order of society.
Dual state theory, which unfortunately originated in, and was based on,
the political practice of Nazi Germany, has been used to conceptualise au-
thoritarian legality and guide our understanding of China’s political and legal
development (Fraenkel 2010; Schmitt 2005). There is a prerogative state in
which authoritarian leaders rule hands-on according to political expedience,
but leave conventional matters to regular legal rules. In the Chinese case,
the duality in the political economy makes a dual legal system. As neo-au-
thoritarianism advances, the Party moves to the front stage and becomes
hands-on in managing important affairs, crowding out legal rules and insti-
tutions. It has expanded and solidified a prerogative state to solve politically
sensitive matters through substantively extra-legal methods. Media gover-
nance is, except for a limited range of private law issues, entirely in the
hands of the Party to be handled politically, leaving the state little role to
play (Lei 2018; Stockmann 2013). Since the end of 2018, in the name of
restructuring Party-state organs, religious and ethnic affairs and a few other
subject matters have been effectively wrestled away from the hands of the
state. In regulating the media, religion, and ethnic affairs, the law is now
silent, and the irrelevance of law over the mass internment in Xinjiang offers
a perfect example of an exceptional state at work. The newly created ex-
ceptional items are added to a long list of sensitive matters over which law
and legal institutions have little control, ranging from collective/mass dis-
putes, terrorism, and national security, to major corruption (Pils 2019).
In the shadow of, but largely parallel to, the extra-legal regime, there is a
normal legal system, less politicised, reform-oriented, and semi-au-
tonomous, which continues to evolve toward maturity and grow in institu-
tionalisation and sophistication by offering rules-based solutions to a wide
range of social conflicts. Private law in post-Mao China has prospered, grow-
ing in form and substance toward a global converging path. In solving ordi-
nary cases relating to the bread and butter issues of ordinary people, the
court operates in a large realm of freedom within the parameters set by the
Party while factoring political considerations into the exercising of judicial
discretion. Among others, He Xin’s research on courts in general and divorce
litigation in particular (He and Lin 2017a, 2017b) offers illuminating exam-
ples of this point. Even the police, the traditional arm of Party repression,
are showing more deference to a trial-centric legal process (Guo’s article in
this issue; see also Nesossi and Trevaskes 2018; Lewis 2011).
How to explain the co-existence of two parallel and potentially opposite
norms, institutional designs, and practices? For the Party-state, the prerog-
ative state is necessary for the maintenance of order and stability in the
normal state, and without the extra-legal power of the Party in the back-
ground, and increasingly in the forefront, any legal normalcy that people
desire and the market demands will collapse. There has always a siege men-
tality in China’s Party-state, and it has been gaining new momentum in re-
cent years. Indeed, the Party’s de facto sovereign power is used to keep its
challengers, real or imagined, at bay, thus maintaining China’s political sta-
bility, protected from the threat of internal and external instability. 
For its critics, the Party creates and sustains a normal legal system for le-
gitimacy, governance, and economic growth. While there may be little, if
any, moral commitment to rule of law, in particular the use of law to curb
arbitrary power, a well-functioning legal system renders credibility to the
otherwise undemocratic and more than occasionally repressive system.
Ironically, China’s success in achieving a higher degree of rule by law legit-
imises the Party-state that is intrinsically hostile to it. The common ground
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between the Party and its critics is that the normal legal system in China is
not autonomous, and it exists largely, if not principally, to serve a particular
instrumental value. If law is simply another tool that the Party uses to gov-
ern, the duality is a superficial distinction without theoretical difference,
and is bound to collapse for lack of theoretical support. 
In the field of Chinese legal studies, there is the methodological tension
between research focusing on mainstream legal practices and that focusing
on China’s exceptionalism. Like the proverbial elephant that was touched
by a blind man, Chinese law, reflecting Chinese political and socio-economic
realities, takes different shapes. It is highly compartmentalised, and depend-
ing on where it is touched, one finds expanding gaps where law is largely
irrelevant; legal traps where a thin legal veil tries to cover political repression;
and legal practices of varying levels of institutionalisation but largely com-
patible with counterparts in any mature legal system. Focusing on the sta-
bility imperative and the resulting repressive and preventative measures,
one sees a clear authoritarian revival and an enhanced Chinese exception-
alism (Minzner 2018; Biddulph 2016); but by shifting attention to routine
legal practices and institutional building, one sees commonalities, compat-
ibilities, and convergences of Chinese law in a global context (Liebman 2015;
Zhang 2012). This Introduction puts forward the argument that while the
Party has been expanding and consolidating an exceptional or prerogative
state in China, it has also recognised, and to a significant degree offered
protection to, a normal legal system, full of Chinese characteristics, of
course. While private law is subject to political control, it has also main-
tained a high degree of autonomy, which is necessary and indispensable in
the current social and economic context. A symbiotic relationship thus ex-
ists between the normalcy and its exception, with each depending on the
other for its existence. Articles in this special issue encourage an academic
dialogue between research on the exceptional state of affairs and that on
routine legal practices. 
The resurgence of the prerogative state
The metaphor of “turning from law,” coined by Minzner (2011), well cap-
tures the decline of the normal legal system and the rise of a Party-domi-
nated, politicised regime of extra-law. There are different ways to
conceptualise a dual state, and it is tempting to refer to Walter Bagehot’s
division between dignified institutions and efficient institutions in the En-
glish Constitution to explain the Party and law’s relevance to each other in
China (Bagehot 1963). For Bagehot, the English constitutional order oper-
ates on two layers. In the shallow layer, “dignified” institutions such as the
monarchy and the House of Lords perform ceremonial functions and cap-
ture public attention and imagination, creating legitimacy for the regime
(ibid.: 61). In a deeper layer, “efficient” institutions, composed of modern
state organs such as the Cabinet and the House of Commons, exert real po-
litical control (ibid.: 66-9). In the English case, the dignified institutions cre-
ate a degree of legitimacy and are also able to hide the exercise of real
power from public purview. The dignified and efficient institutions work
seamlessly in forming a “dual government” structure that offers both effec-
tive and legitimate governance (ibid.: 263). 
Seen from Bagehot’s perspective, one may be tempted to argue that law
in China serves ceremonial functions to create public confidence in the
Party’s ability to adapt and change, and through legal discourses and rituals,
to divert the people’s critical attention away from the Party that wields real
power in the shadows. This is, of course, not to say that law is a mere puppet
of the Party to be used to cover up and legitimise the Party, or that the
Party is entirely invisible to the critical gaze. The salient point is that the
dignified institutions, i.e., legal institutions in China, interact with the Party
organs, the Chinese equivalent to the efficient institutions, in a dynamic
and occasionally contradictory relationship to produce legitimate and ef-
fective governance. Law is not mere window dressing: legal institutions
make, and are seen to have made, significant decisions, with the Party sur-
facing from time to time from the deeper structure to assert open and direct
control.
Under Bagehot’s framework, the CCP would be bound to act as a normal
majority party in the Westminster system, wielding political power through
a parliamentary system. But the CCP does not always hide behind dignified
institutions and is far less patient than its English counterpart with ruling
mainly, if not exclusively, from the shadows of efficient institutions. The CCP
has always ruled directly, hands-on, in some key policy areas, to the exclu-
sion of the dignified institutions. In other words, the dignified institutions
in China, if they may be referred to as such at all, don’t always enjoy dignity. 
If Bagehot’s conceptualisation can be used to envisage a deep state sce-
nario, where law occupies a shallow horizontal plain and Party rules operate
at a deeper structural level, the dual state theory, from a Fraenkelian and
Schmittian perspective, envisages horizontal compartmentalisation – a de-
sign that allows the Party to silence law, crowd legal institutions, and govern
exclusively on its own in some fields, with or without some legal trappings. 
Legality, even a thin conception, ties the hands of autocrats, with the result
that those autocrats may find it necessary to rule directly and extra-legally
(Wang 2015). In some specific areas, which include state security but go
far beyond national security, in a prerogative state ordinary legal rules are
shoved aside, legal institutions are displaced, and rule of law is openly
trumped by political considerations in practice if not in name. 
The boundary between what is prerogative and what is normal is inten-
tionally obscured, and sovereignty decides when and where one ends and
the other starts. Every contention is potentially political and falls within the
jurisdiction of the prerogative state. The Party, following this two-state con-
ceptualisation, is hands-on in countering certain political threats, and in so
doing excludes, or at least significantly marginalises, legal rules. That duality
is nothing new to China, of course. Schmitt as a theorist may have been in-
troduced to China late, but his core conceptualisation of sovereignty, the
enemy, and the distinction between normal and prerogative states res-
onates with the Maoist theory of contradiction and legal duality. That par-
ticular dualism relied on the classification of the people and their enemies,
and an institutional design of democracy and dictatorship that handled con-
tradictions among the people, on the one hand, and contradictions between
the people and their enemies on the other (Brady 1982; Clarke and Feiner-
man 1995).
As the enemy and people distinction, and the related rhetoric, faded
largely into the background, Chinese reform gathered momentum. But that
rhetoric didn’t disappear and has surfaced powerfully with the emergence
of periodic crises such as the 1989 bloodshed in Tiananmen Square; the
1999 suppression of the Falun Gong movement; and the 2009 de facto mar-
tial law imposed in Xinjiang. Each political crisis generates its Schmittian
moment in China, accumulating over the decades to fortify an exception
state, and it has become crystallised and institutionalised under Xi’s lead-
ership (Fu and Zhu 2018; Pils 2019). In comparison with the dualism of the
Maoist decades, where a legal order was largely absent, the new duality
manifests itself as a division of labour between the political sphere directly
4 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1
Editorial
dominated by the Party and a legal sphere with a degree of autonomy op-
erating in the long shadow of the Party. Articles in this Special Issue touch
on the prerogative state: Lin’s chapter questions the new leftist constitu-
tional theory that elevates the Party to the commanding height of
sovereignty, with overriding constitutional authority over the state; he also
critically examines the dual state theory as it is applied in the Chinese case
(Jiang 2014; Li 2015), questioning its explanatory power when the Party
has moved decisively to the front stage, as the example of the State Super-
vision Commission shows.
The enemy looms large in an authoritarian state, and as mentioned earlier,
a politicised, repressive system is often set up side-by-side with the ordinary
criminal justice system to pre-empt and punish political, religious, and eth-
nic dissent (Bakken 2005; Fu 2012). That system, mentioned above, was par-
tially legalised in the 2012 reforms to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)
(Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susongfa 中华人民共和国刑事诉讼
法) and targeted mainly major corruption (through the Party’s disciplinary
machinery, now fused with the State Supervision Commission, described in
Feng Lin’s article in this issue); labour activists such as Zhen Feiyang
(Franceschini and Lin’s article in this issue); and human rights lawyers (Liu,
Hsu, and Halliday’s article in this issue). Through repressive measures, the
Party-state has been colonising the already limited social space and sending
signals that it may be aiming at total, if not totalitarian, control.
Another development is the further extension of Party control over State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) (Leutert 2018), and to a lesser degree over private
and foreign enterprises (Zhang’s article in this issue). As Zhang argues, while
the Party had always used its political power to wrestle market institutions,
the Xi government has been most concerned that control over the eco-
nomic sectors, the SOEs in particular, may be slipping from its control. The
Party prescribes the toughest medicine to cure what it perceives to be mar-
ket failure – imposing and re-imposing direct Party control over decision-
making within the enterprises. The scheme is still unfolding, and it remains
to be seen, as Zhang notes, whether Party’s politics will tame or destroy
the market. 
In this increasingly Schmittian world, how should China’s rule of law pro-
ject be assessed? With the Party’s political power expanding exponentially,
is there a higher degree of autonomy in private law in China? Given that
China’s well-known duality in economic growth takes place side-by-side
with political restriction, the intention may be to quarantine political crack-
downs in public law zones and leave private law breathing room to facilitate
market transactions. After all, is autonomy of private law ever possible in
the Schmittian conceptualisation of the dual state, and will the fragile au-
tonomy of private law in China be able to survive the sustained assault of
the prerogative state?
Authoritarian legality within the dual state
context
The Chinese authoritarian regime has been qualified by many adjectives,
ranging from consultative, transparent, responsive, and participatory, to
competitive, all used to characterise a hybrid regime with softened author-
itarian edges in the political system (Levitsky and Way 2010). Under Xi’s
leadership, the authoritarian system has increasingly become legalistic and
characterised by reference and adherence to formal rules and procedures.
That process is often referred to as legalism or authoritarian legality – de-
fined as “a willingness to both operate in accordance with the written law
and to strengthen the institutions charged with its enforcement” (Zhang
and Ginsburg 2018: 3). The sense of legalism or legality permeates the entire
Party structure, and to quote Zhang and Ginsburg again: “Even if China is
deepening its dictatorship, it is nonetheless doing so through harnessing
the organisational and legitimising capacities of law, rather than circum-
venting it” (ibid.). Even China’s most repressive and most powerful institu-
tions are wrapping their exceptional power in a thin veil of legality (Fu
2017). The Party-state has discovered the empowering aspect of legality,
and has rushed to put it into action under Xi. 
Using law to empower the Party-state in general and the repressive arm
of the Party-state in particular is a new endeavour. It was not until 2012,
when the CPL was further amended, that the Party-state found the confi-
dence and resolve to formally and openly legalise extraordinarily repressive
measures. While repressive powers abounded in China, they were rarely le-
galised in much of the legal reform era. After all, laws in authoritarian states
have the symbolic function to declare what to aspire to in a future Utopia
(Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Law must “be useful” (haoyong 好用) and
also “look good” (haokan 好看), and in the Chinese case, a “good-looking”
law demonstrates sincerity, generates good will, and brings credibility to
the Party for its aspirations (Gallagher 2017; Solomon 2015). 
But over the decades, an incremental change has taken place. Law’s sym-
bolic function is in steady decline and its instrumental value is sharply in-
creasing. Take the police power to detain, for example. The police have the
power to detain suspects for 30 days. But the 30-day detention rule could
not satisfy the time needed to interrogate suspects in sensitive cases – po-
litical dissidents, for instance. To hold them longer, the security police had
to distort the residential surveillance provisions (linshi juzhu 监视居住), a
community supervision mechanism designed mainly for minor offence sus-
pects, to detain political and religious offenders for up to six months. 
This open distortion caused much legal controversy, and in 2012 the CPL
was further amended. The NPC created a power of “designated residential
surveillance” (zhiding linshi juzhu 指定监视居住) for three types of offences:
terrorism, national security, and major corruption, thus legalising the extra-
legal practices.
The psychological barriers to not passing repressive laws were removed.
The practical benefits of a legally empowered dictatorship are easy to see.
It was under Xi that China passed repressive legislation that earlier genera-
tions of leaders were reluctant to promulgate because it wasn’t “good look-
ing.” It takes a powerful leader with resolve to achieve that agenda, and
under Xi, the Chinese NPC and its Standing Committee passed a series of
security-related laws, on instructions from the Party, that were not put on
the legislative agenda by the NPC itself. The end of constitutional term-
limits and the creation of a Supervision Commission that is legally placed
under tight Party control were other examples of authoritarian legalism.
Lin Feng’s essay discusses the fusion between Party rules and state laws,
focusing on two dimensions of China’s authoritarian legality. One is the
massive effort to formalise Party regulations and rules to create a parallel
normative order under the Party. Following the example of the state in
cleaning up the legislative field in the post-Legislative Law era, the Party in
the Xi era launched a campaign to tidy up Party rules to make them more
“law-like” in both making and implementing Party rules. Indeed, as Lin notes,
Party rules have become topical research that is well-funded, institution-
alised, and hotly pursued. Second is the preparatory work, at both the
rhetorical and practical levels, to elevate Party rules to the status of state
law and treat them as such. Within less than five years, the position that
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Party law is part of China’s rule of law has evolved from heresy to main-
stream viewpoint, and the successful fusion of the Party and the state in
the State Supervision Commission has showcased Xi’s neo-authoritarian le-
gality at work. 
China’s increasing micro-management of Hong Kong offers another case
study of authoritarian legality as a governance tool. (2) Through what Han
Zhu refers to as “aggressive legality,” China has effectively used legal instru-
ments provided for in the Basic Law to neutralise political resistance and
to stifle independent voices in Hong Kong. Through the handing down of
legislative interpretations and promulgating decisions, the central authori-
ties have been able to maximise control over Hong Kong while at the same
time maintaining a high degree of legality and credibility through legality,
at the cost of Hong Kong’s liberal legal order. 
Duality and the semi-autonomy of private
law 
To what degree can a normal legal system, in the Fraenkelian sense, exist
and survive the assault of the expansive and assertive prerogative state? If
the boundary between the norm and exception cannot be effectively policed,
the enterprise of a dual state will collapse. Strong evidence exists to show
that repressive measures of the exceptional state cannot be effectively sealed
off, and they leak to the other side, creating contamination in the normal
system. Repressive measures against the Falun Gong spiritual movement and
underground Christian churches necessarily create a chilling impact on all
religious practices (Yang 2005; Wang 2017); the prosecution of human rights
lawyers has placed the entire legal profession, bar associations, law firms,
and individual lawyers alike, on notice (Fu 2018; Fu and Zhu 2018; Pils 2018);
and as the Xinjiang internment case shows, exceptional measures that were
initially limited to terrorists can spread quickly and be used against society
as a whole. How strong is a normal legal system in resisting the overreaching
of the exceptional state? If the repressive arm and the legal arm are merely
different tools at the disposal of the Party in extending its control, then what
is the point of seeing them as a duality? There are good reasons to doubt
whether China has a normal legal system as the term is understood.
My response is that there is a duality in the Chinese legal system, and
after 40 years of legal reform, there is a private law system that has become
professionalised, institutionalised, and semi-autonomous. Parallel to a highly
politicised and highly unpredictable prerogative system, there is a normal
legal system in operation, offering a high degree of predictability and cer-
tainty for the parties using it.
China has an entirely different political environment to that of the Weimar
Republic, from which the dual state theory of Carl Schmitt was developed.
The Party has been firmly in charge since 1949, and China does not have
pluralistic forces from within to challenge the sovereignty of the Party. The
context of a collapsing Weimar Republic in which Schmitt developed his
total, if not totalitarian, state was entirely different. Chinese sovereignty is
not up for grabs, and the Party is comfortably in charge. China has evolved
away, in its typical zigzag fashion, from a total/totalitarian state towards
controlled pluralism and managed autonomy in the social and economic
sectors. The Chinese Communists were building a normal legal system on
authoritarian grounds. That legal system is necessarily shallow in its roots
and fragile in its existence, but the soil for its growth is there.
For 40 years, China has had a vibrant private sector in which individuals
have repeatedly traded and interacted with each other with a high degree
of freedom and autonomy. A large body of private law has been created to
facilitate and regulate social and economic activities. While lagging behind
social and economic changes, and sometimes poorly designed and fre-
quently ill-implemented, those legal rules have been well accepted and have
gradually become routine social practices, forming part of a spontaneous
order. Contract responsibilities, tortious liabilities, and private property are
well-accepted, taken-for-granted norms and have become indispensable in
guiding social interactions and economic transactions, forming the norma-
tive foundation for economic exchanges and social interaction, and offering
institutionalised mechanisms for dispute resolution. 
The autonomy is determined by the nature of private law, which tran-
scends regime type once it is in operation. Ernest Weinrib refers to it as cor-
rective justice, void of external collective purpose. Unlike issues of
distributive justice that require the state to balance conflicting interests
and make a value judgment as to the criteria for assigning resources, cor-
rective justice issues, according to Weinrib, do not require the determination
of an external collective purpose (Weinrib 2012: 210-2). For contract law,
since the contract must be made freely and must be enforced – or else there
would be no transaction and no market – private law must allow each party
to pursue his/her own goals and protect the equal standing of the parties.
It therefore often only concerns the immediate link between the parties
with no external collective purpose (ibid.: 212-3). Private law cannot be sep-
arate from the interactions it regulates (ibid.: 204-6).
Once a market economy takes off, actors with free will participate in mar-
ket transactions, expecting and demanding legal enforcement of contracts
and protection of private property as an essential aspect of the market. So-
ciety also becomes plural, and conflicts multiply, all requiring a legal system
that is perceived as fair, predictable, and authoritative. As Franceschini and
Lin’s article illustrates, there is a strong demand for rights and fairness
among workers (Lee 2007; Ngai 2016). If the existing law and legal design
are perceived to be narrow, ineffective, or otherwise not credible to meet
the demand of ever-increasing rights awareness, workers, with the assistance
of labour NGOs, will bypass existing legal institutions and bring their
grievances for extra-legal resolution (Fu and Distelhorst 2018). In accepting
the existing political system, as the authors hint, the only viable resolution
for labour disputes in China is to re-design the existing labour legal system
to legalise workers’ right to fair and effective bargaining in formulating their
labour contracts. Liu, Hsu, and Halliday’s article also makes a similar argu-
ment: liberal-oriented lawyers use law, as either a shield or a sword, in their
struggle to protect basic legal rights and freedoms within China’s authori-
tarian political framework, but the legal systems’ failure to meet that ele-
mentary legal demand is likely to lead to an escalation of legal contention
and politicisation of rights. 
Professionalism also matters in maintaining private law autonomy in
China. A legal system has its own institutional characteristics and prospers
only when it pursues its unique institutional objectives. Proceduralism, pro-
fessionalism, and rule-based decision-making are the comparative advan-
tage of courts in competing with other political institutions, which legal
institutions work to establish. Reflecting and reinforcing a vibrant private
social and economic sector, legal actors, including those in an authoritarian
state, would be incentivised to make its private law autonomous and ef-
fective so as to safeguard their own institutional interests and reinforce
their professional identity. Over the past 40 years, the growth in Chinese
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contract law, tort law, marriage law, and company law – including legal rules,
procedures, and institutionalised practices – offers ample evidence to sup-
port a general autonomy thesis, according to which the courts demonstrate
their ability to absorb and internalise political commands, and factor in po-
litical concerns through the exercise of legal discretion. In the Chinese case,
while private law operates within an authoritarian political system, and re-
ceives and submits to occasional political intrusion, it is based on certain
social and economic practices that develop their own rules and structure
and maintain their autonomy and integrity.
The autonomy of private law does not mean that is isolated from society
and politics. First, being autonomous does not mean that private law is de-
tached from social reality and non-political; it does not prevent private law
from engaging in social justice and public interest (Weinrib 2012). Public
interest law, based on private law rights, such as consumer protection or
gender equality, while having been subjected to government restrictions,
has survived authoritarian repression and remains alive. Feminists and labour
activists have been struggling persistently for equality rights for decades,
based on the civil law right to personality. After continuous litigation, media
mobilisation, and political lobbying by both state and civil society actors,
the SPC has finally created a new cause of action for equal employment
and sexual harassment, (3) paving the way for another likely round of socio-
legal mobilisation for equality rights, gender equality in particular, in China. 
Second, autonomy is, of course, a relative term, and under the leadership
of the Party, which is often regarded as both absolute and omnipresent, pri-
vate law is consistently subjected to the political imperatives imposed on
the legal system. Therefore, there is a large body of legal norms, properly
made, public, and self-referencing, to govern social and economic activities,
but the Party can always intrude and damage its integrity. The Hero and Mar-
tyr Provision (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yingxiong lieshi baohufa 中华
人民共和国英雄烈士保护法), suddenly inserted into the Chinese Civil Law
(Article 185) to offer blanket legal protection of the right to reputation to
anyone who had been officially named a revolutionary hero or martyr, and
subsequent legislation to offer comprehensive protection, (4) is regarded as a
significant modification to the equality doctrine in civil law, and a political
intrusion into an otherwise cohesive civil law regime (Pils 2019). Chinese
legal reform has rich and thick procedures and rules of evidence, creating a
prototype of proceduralism to follow in bread-and-butter cases. Yet, once
disputes become collective, presenting a threat – real or imagined – to public
order and social stability, they mutate into cases of great political concern,
and the courts, under political pressure, immediately put legal procedures
aside and elevate an ordinary type of case for extraordinary treatment. China
has been designing a company structure to improve its corporate gover-
nance, desperately trying to learn “best practices” from both civil and com-
mon law jurisdictions. Yet, the sudden requirement to set up a built-in Party
leadership that fuses political and executive decisions, paralleling the political
system, risks undermining the already fragile corporate structure, as Zhang’s
article in this issue and other studies amply demonstrate. 
Can law re-shape the Chinese Leviathan?
Even in sensitive areas of public law, such as judicial review in general and
judicial control over interrogational torture in particular, legal doctrines and
institutions have been in steady development to empower judicial control over
the government, including the police. Indeed, while constitutionalism has be-
come a taboo topic, and scholars have moved away from hard-core constitu-
tional questions, a vibrant discussion is on-going to explore the possibility of
implementing constitutional rights in ordinary legislation. But can the normal
legal system create an impact in shaping exceptional, repressive law?
Having accepted the possibility of a semi-autonomous sphere for private
law to provide corrective justice, is it possible to go one step further to de-
velop a distributive impact? Can private law moderate centralised power
and soften its authoritarian edge? There has been a long-standing expecta-
tion/wishful thinking, among human rights lawyers and liberal leaning re-
formers in particular, that law reform will have a liberalising and
emancipatory impact on the authoritarian system. That hope had been
dashed over the past five years due to a renewed assault on liberal ideas
and further entrenchment of authoritarian rule. But given my analysis on
the autonomy of private law and resilience of a normal legal system and
the large context of duality, do we have to give up on the law’s potential to
engender change? 
While the repressive system leaks into and adversely affects the integrity
of the normal system, as mentioned above, there is also evidence of a pos-
itive influence in the other direction. It is well known that the legal proce-
dures in anti-corruption investigations have had a certain impact in offering
the Party a model for redesigning its powerful, extra-legal, disciplinary
mechanisms (Fu 2017). The Party learns from the legal system how to make
rules, implement rules, and take rules and procedures seriously. Criminal de-
fence lawyers apply aggressive strategies developed in defending regular
cases to exceptional cases, major corruption cases in particular, posing a
major inconvenience, if not a challenge, to the Party’s secretive detention
regime. When judicial activism creates an impact by preventing interroga-
tion torture in ordinary criminal cases, the impact is highly likely to be felt
by those who may resort to torture in those extraordinary cases. The trial-
centric system that the Party is promoting is likely to have some impact
on controlling some of the excesses of the exceptional regime. 
Two articles in this Special Issue offer some evidence of law’s liberalising
potential to limit state power. Guo Zhiyuan’s article deals with two aspects
of the criminal justice system that have direct bearing on the dual state:
interrogation torture and judicial control of torture. The former relates to
what is often perceived to be at the core of an authoritarian regime, where
torture is sanctioned to force public confessions; and the latter to a core
liberal institution designed to allow the court to control the repressive arm
of the regime. Guo’s article confronts the questions: How big a problem has
interrogation torture been in China? How effective has the newly designed
exclusionary rule been, and could be, in reining in interrogation torture? In-
directly, her article touches on the core question: What is the political func-
tion of the judiciary in holding the government to legal accountability?
Likewise, the article by Cui, Cheng, and Wiesner uses judicial review of
government actions, with a focus on doctrinal and institutional changes, as
an indicator to measure the governments’ attitude towards the rule of law.
As the authors point out, those changes have the potential to further em-
power the courts and to motivate judges when deciding lawsuits against
the government, potentially sending out a political message that the court
has a more activist and forceful role to play than before in holding the gov-
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3. Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Adding Causes of Action in Civil Cases (Zui gao renmin
fayuan guanyu zengjia minshi anjian anyou de tongzhi, 最高人民法院关于增加民事案件案由
的通知), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=637239 (accessed on 1 March 2019).
4. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs (Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo yingxiong lieshi baohufa, 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 英 雄 烈 士 保 护 法 ),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-04/27/content_2053965.htm (accessed on 1 March
2019).
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ernment legally accountable. Again, as Guo’s article implies, the Cui, Cheng,
and Wiesner article also rests effective judicial review on the availability of
a strong political view to support a particular mechanism that actually bites. 
No doubt there has been a prerogative state operating in China, either
entirely outside the legal system or with a thin legal veil barely covering
political expedience. It has become more visible, expansive, and assertive
under Xi’s rule. Crackdowns on political and religious dissent, reinforcement
of censorship, and the highly politicised anti-corruption and anti-mafia
campaigns are all powerful examples of an expanding prerogative state. Oc-
cupying a politically commanding height, the state proceeds, dangerously,
to erode the fuzzy and vulnerable line between the prerogative and normal
state and expand indefinitely, threatening to engulf the normal system.
But there is an emerging normal state, with the private law at the core
to institutionalise semi-autonomy. Against a repressive political system
and a narrowing public law space, private law proves to be resilient. But
the semi-autonomous space of private law is a fragile one: it was created
by the Party-state for a highly instrumental purpose; it has shallow roots
in the Chinese eco-system; and it has been under periodical siege by a
suspicious political system. It is the demands from the autonomous social
and economic sectors that makes a semi-autonomous private law indis-
pensable. Chinese contract law is an integral part of the market transac-
tion, just as marriage law is embedded in the Chinese family. Private law,
as fragile and vulnerable as it is in China, reflects and regulates sponta-
neous order, and the Party has to show a high degree of deference to, and
offer protection for, that order to remain credible and authoritative. On
their own, legal institutions have become pivotal points in solving China’s
private disputes. 
Semi-independent of a repressive state of exception, private law in au-
thoritarian China continues to command some respect and maintains a
degree of credibility because, while operating in a politicised parameters,
it guides people’s behaviour, provides some certainty in an area of great
social and economic transition, and offers a forum for dispute resolution.
It is an integral part of social and economic reform. On occasion, it be-
comes a useful mechanism to discipline lower-ranking bureaucracies and
their functionaries into compliance with rules. The entire legal system is
undoubtedly placed under the firm leadership of the Party, but in routine
social and economic affairs, the latter mainly sets an elastic parameter in
which normal institutions operate with relative autonomy.
z Fu Hualing is Warren Chan Professor in Human Rights and
Responsibilities, Faculty of Law, the University of Hong Kong
(hlfu@hku.hk).
8 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1
Editorial
References
BAGEHOT, Walter. 1963. The English Constitution. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
BAKKEN, Børge (ed.). 2005. Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China. Lan-
ham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
BIDDULPH, Sarah. 2016. The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law
in China. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
BRADY, James. 1982. Justice and Politics in People’s China: Legal Order or
Continuing Revolution? London: Academic Press.
CLARKE, Donald C., and Jim V. FEINERMAN. 1995. “Antagonistic Contra-
dictions: Criminal Law and Human Rights in China.” The China Quarterly
141: 135-54.
FRAENKEL, Ernst. 2010. The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of
Dictatorship. Clark: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd.
FU, Diana, and Greg DISTELHORST. 2018. “Grassroots Participation and
Repression under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.” The China Journal 79: 100-22.
FU, Hualing. 2012. “Responses to Terrorism in China.” In Victor V. Ramraj,
Michael Hor, Kent Roach, and George Williams (eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism
Law and Policy (2nd edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 234-
56.
FU, Hualing. 2017. “China’s Striking Anticorruption Adventure: A Political
Journey Toward the Rule of Law?” In Weitseng Chen (ed.), The Beijing Con-
sensus? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 249-74.
FU, Hualing. 2018. “The July 9th (709) Crackdown on Human Rights
Lawyers: Legal Advocacy in an Authoritarian State.” Journal of Contempo-
rary China 27: 554-68.
FU, Hualing, and Han ZHU. 2018. “After the July 9 (709) Crackdown: The
Future of Human Rights Lawyering.” Fordham International law Journal
41: 1135-64.
GALLAGHER, Mary E. 2017. Authoritarian Legality in China: Law, Workers,
and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
GINSBURG, Tom, and Alberto SIMPSER. 2014. “Introduction: Constitutions
in Authoritarian Regimes.” In Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser (eds.),
Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1-17.
HE, Xin, and Fen LIN. 2017a. “‘No Malicious Incidents’: The Concern for
Stability in China’s Divorce Law Practice.” Social & Legal Studies 4(26):
467-89.
HE, Xin, and Fen LIN. 2017b. “Chinese Courts in Politics.” China Law and
Society Review 2: 129-53. 
JIANG, Shigong. 2014. “Chinese-Style Constitutionalism: On Backer’s Chi-
nese Party-state Constitutionalism.” Modern China 40: 196-213.
LEE, Ching Kwan. 2007. Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt
and Sunbelt. Berkeley: University of California Press.
LEI, Ya-Wen. 2018. The Contentious Public Sphere: Law, Media and Author-
itarian Rule in China. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
LEUTERT, Wendy. 2018. “Firm Control: Governing the State-owned Econ-
omy Under Xi Jinping.” China Perspectives 1-2: 27-36.
LEWIS, Margaret K. 2011. “Controlling Abuse to Maintain Control: The Ex-
clusionary Rule in China.” New York University Journal of International Law
& Policy 43: 629-97.
LEVITSKY, Steven, and Lucan A. WAY. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
LI, Ling. 2015. “‘Rule of Law’ in a Party-state: A Conceptual Interpretative
Framework of the Constitutional Reality of China.” Asian Journal of Law
and Society 2: 93-113.
LIEBMAN, Benjamin L. 2015. “Leniency in Chinese Criminal Law? Everyday
Justice in Henan.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 33: 153-222.
MINZNER, Carl F. 2011. “Turning against Law.” American Journal of Com-
parative Law 59: 935-84.
MINZNER, Carl F. 2018. End of An Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival
is Undermining Its Rise. New York: Oxford University Press.
N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 9
Fu Hualing – Duality and China’s Struggle for Legal Autonomy 
NESOSSI, Elisa, and Susan TREVASKES. 2018. Procedural Justice and the
Fair Trial in Contemporary Chinese Criminal Justice. Leiden and Boston:
Brill. 
PILS, Eva. 2018. “China’s Turn to Public Repression: The Case of the 709
Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers.” China Law and Society Review 3:
1-47. 
PILS, Eva. 2019. “China’s Dual State Revival.” Unpublished manuscript.
PUN, Ngai. 2016. Migrant Labor in China: Post-Socialist Transformations.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
ROSENZWEIG, Joshua. 2016. “Residential Surveillance: evolution of a
Janus-faced measure.” In Eliza Nesossi, Sarah Biddulph, Flora Sapio, and
Sue Trevaskes (eds.), Legal Reforms and Deprivation of Liberty in Contem-
porary China. Abington: Routledge. 
SCHMITT, Carl. 2005. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of
Sovereignty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
SOLOMON, Peter. 2015. “Law and Judges in Authoritarian States,” World
Politics 60: 122-45.
STOCKMANN, Daniela. 2013. Media Commercialization and Authoritarian
Rule in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
UNGER, Roberto. 1976. Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of So-
cial Theory. Glencoe: Free Press.
WANG, Shucheng. 2017. “Tripartite Freedom of Religion in China: An Illib-
eral Perspective.” Human Rights Quarterly 39: 783-810.
WANG, Yuhua. 2015. Tying the Autocrat’s Hands: The Rise of The Rule of
Law in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
WEINRIB, Ernest J. 2012. The Idea of Private Law. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
YANG, Fenggang. 2005. “The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in
China.” The Sociological Quarterly 47: 93-122.
ZHANG, Taisu. 2012. “The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme
People’s Court of China.” Columbia Journal of Asian Law 25: 1-61. 
ZHANG, Taisu, and Tom GINSBURG. 2018. “Legality in Contemporary Chi-
nese Politics.” Virginia Journal of International Law (forthcoming); Yale Law
School, Public Law Research Paper No. 657, University of Chicago, Public
Law Working Paper No. 689, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250948 (ac-
cessed on 1 March 2019).
